3 Ergebnisse.

Some of our attitudes are fitting, others unfitting. Fitting attitudes get things right. Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way argue that fittingness is the key to understanding the normative domain - the domain of reasons, obligations, and value. They argue that fittingness is a normatively basic property, on which all other normative properties depend.

This edited volume advances the new subdiscipline of metaepistemology by drawing on the sophisticated frameworks that have been developed in metaethics concerning practical normativity. Chapters examine whether these theories can be applied to epistemic normativity and consider what this may tell us about both epistemic and practical normaitivity.

Brings together work in ethics and epistemology, and examines the intersection of the two~Contributions by both leading figures in the field and up-and-coming researchers~Introductory essay by the editors provides overview of the topic and orientates the reader